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In this paper we use the CGE model DART to assess the economic impacts and optimality of the 
different aspects of the EU climate package. A special focus is placed on the 10% biofuel target in the 
EU. In particular we analyze the development in the biofuel sectors, the effects on agricultural 
production and prices and finally overall welfare implications. The main findings include that the EU 
emission targets alone only lead to minor increases in biofuel production. Additional subsidies are 
necessary to reach the 10% biofuel target. This in turn increases European agricultural prices by up to 
7%. Additional welfare losses compared to a cost-effective scenario where the EU 20% emission 
reduction target is reached occur due to separated carbon markets and the renewable quotas. The 
biofuel target has relatively small negative or even positive welfare effects in some scenarios. 
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To demonstrate global leadership for a long-term international climate regime, the European Union 
(EU) decided a variety of climate targets in 2007/08. Besides the two targets that are the focus of the 
EU transition scenarios analyzed in EMF 22 (see overview article) –  a reduction of at least 20% 
[relative to 1990] in emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and a 20% share of renewable energies in 
the EU’s energy consumption by 2020 – the so-called climate-energy package that has finally passed 
the European Parliament in December 2008 additionally contains a 10% minimum target for the 
market share of renewable transport fuels, which are in effect biofuels for the most part, by 2020 
(Council of the European Union, 2008).  
In the context of energy security and climate protection, bioenergy is bestowed high importance. 
Biofuels have received growing attention particularly because they are able to replace fossil energy in 
the transport sector. They are seen as a valuable option since the transport sector is contributing an 
increasing share to global carbon emissions and other renewable energy sources usually only replace 
fossil fuels in the electricity sector (wind, hydro, photovoltaics) or in the provision of heat (wood 
pellets, geothermal energy, solar thermal energy). Currently, only Brazil is able to produce bioethanol 
from sugar cane at sufficiently low costs to be competitive with conventional fuels. But for the reasons 
just explained, in many countries including several EU members, bioenergy and biofuels are supported 
by government schemes such as quotas, tax exemptions and direct production subsidies, which have 
resulted in a growing production and consumption of biofuels worldwide. In the EU, Germany has the 
highest share of biofuels in total fuel consumption with slightly more than 7%; other countries among 
them Cyprus and Finland have biofuel shares of close to zero.
1 On average, the share in the EU was 
2.6% in 2007 (EurObserv’ER, 2008). More recently, the governmental support for bioenergy has been 
heavily criticized especially in the context of rapidly rising food prices in 2007/2008. The heated ‘food 
vs. fuel’ debate has consequently emerged reflecting the fear that enhanced biofuel production may 
lead to enormous land use competition that would drive up agricultural product prices and ultimately 
food prices. It is therefore vital to get a better understanding of the economy-wide impacts of 
                                                      
1 National biofuels reports by EU member states reporting under Directive 2003/30/EC can obtained from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/bioenergy/ms_reports_dir_2003_30_en.htm.   
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enhanced bioenergy production and especially its impact on land use competition and on agricultural 
and ultimately food prices.  
The economic effects of the EU climate policy, including those of the EU climate package, have been 
analyzed before (e.g. Klepper and Peterson 2006a, 2008, Wobst et al., 2007), and one of their special 
focuses has been the effects of the separated carbon markets with part of the emissions covered within 
the European emissions trading scheme (ETS) and part of the emissions outside the ETS. The main 
findings in those studies are that overall the negative welfare and competitiveness effects are rather 
small but that the separated carbon markets may lead to substantial inefficiencies. In addition, two 
studies analyze the effects of the EU 10% biofuel targets (Banse et al., 2008; Boeters et al., 2008). 
Banse et al. (2008) find a considerable impact of European biofuel policy on the global and European 
agricultural markets with higher feedstock prices and expansion of global agricultural land use 
especially due to increases in land-abundant countries. Boeters et al. (2008) find only small impacts on 
agricultural prices and focus on the interaction of European biofuel policy and the EU ETS in their 
analysis. The introduction of a mandatory 10% target reduces carbon taxes in the non-ETS sectors. 
This beneficial effect is, however, weakened by the negative effect of higher transport fuel prices with 
the net welfare effect for the EU-27 being slightly positive but negligible. 
The aim of this paper is to combine the EMF’s common scenarios of the EU climate package with the 
additional 10% biofuel target. Our study integrates the newest EU targets and also differs with respect 
to the implementation of biofuels (see Kretschmer and Peterson, 2008 for an overview about different 
modeling approaches). We model a wider set of biofuel scenarios than in the studies mentioned above. 
Besides the core scenario where we assume a 10% biofuel target for each of the EU countries either 
under full trading or in the case of separated carbon markets, we also analyze a scenario with a more 
efficient overall 10% target for the EU. Our focus is the effects of the biofuel targets on carbon prices 
and welfare compared to the scenarios without a biofuel target but also on the effects on EU and world 
agricultural markets.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In sections 2 and 3 we briefly describe the version of the DART model 
that is used in this paper and the scenarios that are analyzed. In sections 4 and 5 we present the 
simulation results in the core scenarios and the biofuel scenarios, respectively. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. A brief description of the DART model with bioenergy 
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) Model is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive 
dynamic CGE-model of the world economy. For the simulation of European bioenergy policies, it is 
calibrated to an aggregation of 12 regions that include the major bioenergy producing regions (in 
particular Brazil; also Malaysia and Indonesia) as well as the main bioenergy consuming regions 
(including the USA and different EU regions). In each model region, there are 27 sectors shown in 
table 1. There are 13 energy sectors including different types of renewable energy, but also 11 
agricultural sectors that include the most important energy crops.  
The economy in each region is modeled as a competitive economy with flexible prices and market 
clearing. There exist three types of agents: a representative consumer, a representative producer in 
each sector and regional governments. All regions are connected through bilateral trade flows. CO2 
emissions are derived from the use of fossil fuels. The static model is calibrated to the GTAP6 
database (Dimaranan, 2006) that represents production and trade data for 2001. 
Biofuels are modeled as latent technologies that are active from the year 2005 on. The two biofuel 
sectors use different feedstock inputs (wheat, corn and sugar beet/sugar cane for ethanol; vegetable oil 
and oil seeds for biodiesel) as well as capital, labor and electricity to produce perfect substitutes for 
diesel and gasoline based on fossil fuels. The different cost structures for biofuels were defined with 
the help of the meó Consulting Team, a consultancy that has built up potential expertise in the 
bioenergy industry (personal communication with meó, 2007). Costs are then scaled up by a mark-up 
that accounts for the cost disadvantage of biofuels compared to fossil fuels. Mark-ups are calculated 
based on the quality difference between bio- and conventional fuels and bio- and conventional fuel 
prices. Furthermore, the benchmark assumes that 2005 biofuel consumption shares remain constant 
until the year 2020. These shares are shown in table 2. Concerning biofuel trade, whose modeling is 
technically difficult for a latent technology (see Kretschmer and Peterson, 2008), we only account for 
the most important trade flows: Bioethanol trade only takes place between Brazil and the 
industrialized countries and Malaysia/Indonesia is the only region that exports biodiesel, though the 
amount is currently almost negligible. Vegetable oils used for the production of biodiesel can of  
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course be traded. Import tariffs for bioenergy were calculated based on OECD/FAO (2008). For a 
detailed description of the implementation of biofuels into DART see Kretschmer et al. (2008). 
Table 1: DART regions and sectors 
Countries and regions 
EU and other Annex B  Non-Annex B 
DEU Germany  BRA Brazil 
GBR  UK, Ireland  LAM  Rest of Latin America 
FRA France  IND India 
SCA    Denmark, Sweden, Finland  CPA  China, Hong Kong 
BEN  Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg    MAI  Indonesia, Malaysia 
MED  Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Malta  PAS  Rest of Pacific Asia 
REU  Rest of EU27  MEA  Middle East & North Africa 
USA  United States of America  AFR  Sub-Saharan Africa  
OCD  Rest industrialized OECD      
FSU  Former Soviet Union     
Production sectors/commodities 
Energy Sectors  Agricultural Sectors 
COL   Coal Extraction  WHT  Wheat 
GAS  Nat. Gas Production & Distribution  COR* Corn 
CRU  Crude Oil  GRO  Other Cereal Grains 
GSL*  Motor Gasoline   OSD  Oil Seeds 
DIS*  Motor Diesel  VOL  Vegetable Oils and Fats 
OIL  Other Refined Oil Products  C_B  Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet 
BET  Bioethanol as a substitute for GSL  SGR  Sugar 
BDS  Biodiesel as a substitute for DIS  MLK  Raw Milk  
ELY  Non-renewable electricity + hydro  MET  Meat 
SOL  Solar electricity  AGR  Rest agric. & food products 
GEO Geothermal  FRS  Forestry 
WIN Wind  power  Other Sectors 
SBIO  Solid Biomass electricity  ETS  Energy intensive sectors in EU ETS  
   CRP  Chemical  products 
    OTH  Other Manufactures & Services 
* These sectors where disaggregated from the original GTAP6 database, see Kretschmer et al. (2008) for details.   
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Biodiesel (oil seeds 
and vegetable oils)  SUM  wheat  sugar beet/cane  corn 
DEU 6.9  0.7  0.3  0.1  0.3 
FRA 1.8  1.8  0.45  0.9  0.45 
GBR 0.3  0.1  0.1  -  - 
SCA 0.7  2.1    2.1  - 
BEN 0.1  0.1  0.05  -  0.05 
MED 0.5 0.5  0.25  -  0.25 
REU 0.5  0.5  0.499  0.001  - 
USA 0.3  2.6  -  -  2.6 
BRA 0.1  40.0  -  40.0  - 
OECD 0.05  0.4  -  0.2  0.2 
CPA -  1.7  1.7  -  - 
IND 0.6  1.7  -  1.7  - 
Source: OECD/FAO 2008, personal communication with meó Consulting Team  
 
In the previous versions of DART, renewable energy production was incorporated in the energy 
bundle but its relative shares out of total energy production were invisible. In order to model the policy 
scenarios that include a renewable target, we here added a set of functions to DART that explicitly 
calculate renewable energy production besides biofuels. For simplicity and also due to data limitation, 
we only consider four types of renewable electricity production (wind, geothermal, solar and solid 
biomass: heat not included) in EU sub-regions. Hydropower is implicitly included in the production 
functions of conventional electricity. Data on prices and mid-term potentials for renewables are taken 
from IEA (2007),
2 and the input shares are based on the IER-Stuttgart MARKAL data (personal 
communication). Since renewable electricity is generally more expensive than conventional electricity 
by assumption, implementation of the 20% target policy is essentially a question of subsidy allocation, 
on which we take the following assumption: each EU sub-region produces renewables at least at the 
current level, and additional amounts to meet the target are allocated in such a way as to minimize the 
                                                      
2 The sum of IEA’s mid-term potentials (up to 2020) is close to the EU’s target level in 2020 and in fact short of the target 
under our modeling assumption (see section 3). We scaled the wind power potentials by 25% to produce the quantity at the 
target level in the model.   
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total size of subsidy for the whole EU. This means that some types, such as geothermal energy in 
MED, are preferred over others and exploited first until the potential limit. Without the EU 20% 
target, renewable electricity production is increased only as much as to be in accordance with a rising 
electricity price. To account for the fact that we only model renewable electricity we translate the 20% 
renewable target for primary energy consumption into a target for renewable electricity consumption 
(see section 3).   
The DART model is recursive-dynamic, meaning that it solves for a sequence of static one-period 
equilibria for different time periods connected through capital accumulation. The major exogenous 
drivers of the model dynamics are the change in the labor force, the rate of labor productivity growth, 
the change in human capital, the savings rate, and the gross rate of return on capital, which determine 
the endogenous rate of capital accumulation. The savings behavior of regional households is 
characterized by a constant savings rate over time.  
Labor supply evolves exogenously over time. The growth rate is derived from the growth of the labor 
force (based on population and participation rate projections), the growth of the human capital and the 
total factor productivity. Current period's investment augments the capital stock in the next period. The 
aggregated regional capital stock at each period is updated by an accumulation function equating the 
next-period capital stock with the sum of the depreciated capital stock of the current period and the 
current period's physical quantity of investment. The allocation of capital among sectors follows from 
the intra-period optimization of the firms. Finally, the supply of the third factor land is fixed over time. 
The modeling horizon for this paper is the year 2020.  
 
3. Scenarios  
The DART model is used to run a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, the four coordinated EU 
scenarios, plus six additional bioenergy scenarios (summarized in table 3). The BAU scenario is 
calibrated to reproduce the EIA energy consumption data for 2005 and the UN emission data for 2005. 
Furthermore, the elasticities of substitution for the energy goods, i.e., coal, gas, and crude oil, are 
calibrated in such a way as to reproduce the emission projections by the IEA (IEA, 2008).    
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For the coordinated policy scenarios, we derive emission targets for the sectors covered by the ETS 
and those outside the ETS from the National Allocation Plans, the EU climate package and recent 
emission data relative to 2005 emissions. We assume that non-ETS emissions from 2005 and ETS 
emissions from 2012 are reduced linearly to reach the 2020 targets shown in figure 1 below. In the 
scenarios with an emission trading scheme covering all sources of CO2 (i.e., the scenario group UNI in 
table 3), the regional carbon targets are the sum of the targets for the ETS sectors and the targets for 
the non-ETS sectors. In the scenarios with separated carbon markets (i.e., the scenario group NETS in 
table 3), only the sectors ETS, CRP, OIL, GSL, DIS and ELY are included in the ETS. The targets in 
the non-ETS sectors are reached by a uniform regional carbon tax or a regional emission trading 
scheme within the non-ETS sectors. The tax is distributed in a lump-sum fashion to consumers. For 
simplicity, the possibility of using CDM and JI credits is not considered in all scenarios. For the USA 
and the remaining OECD countries, we assume that emissions are started to be reduced in 2012 to 
reach a 50% reduction by 2050. The targets are also reached by a uniform carbon tax. Figure 1 shows 
the different emission reductions targets in 2020 relative to the year 2005.
3  
  
[Figure 1. EU CO2 reduction targets in 2020 relative to 2005]  
 
The renewable target for the EU is a 20% share of renewable energy in total final energy consumption. 
DART, however, is only able to model renewable energy in the electricity sector (and biofuels 
separately). A rough calculation shows that assuming a fixed share of biofuels at current levels the 
20% renewable target implies a 30% share of renewables in the electricity sector (see also the paper by 
Böhringer et al. in this volume that use the same target). These renewable energy targets are not 
imposed on each individual EU member state or sub-region but on the entire EU, and are set to 
achieve the 30% level by 2020.  
 
                                                      
3 Note that implementing the relative emission targets for the ETS and the non-ETS sectors as announced by the EU leads to 
only 16% overall emission reduction relative to 2005 with the emission split in the DART model – and not as the EU 
calculates 20%.  
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Table 3: Overview of scenarios 
EU Emission and 
renewable targets 
Biofuel target 
[UNI]: full EU CO2-
trading 
[NETS]: ETS + 
regional CO2-tax in 
non- ETS 
EU’s 2020 emission 
targets 
no biofuel target  UNI_20  NETS_20 
EU’s 2020 emission 
targets + 30% renewable 
target  
no biofuel target  UNI_20_20  NETS_20_20 
10% in each EU 
country 
UNI_20_20_10a NETS_20_20_10a 
EU’s 2020 emission 
targets + 30% renewable 
target     + 10% biofuel 
target   10% in entire EU  UNI_20_20_10b  NETS_20_20_10b 
10% in each EU 
country 
 NETS_20_10a 
EU’s 2020 emission 
targets  + 10% biofuel 
target (sensitivity runs 
discussed in section 5.3)  10% in entire EU    NETS_20_10b 
 
To analyze the effects of the additional biofuel target we define two sets of additional scenarios that 
are simulated both for full EU emissions trading and separated carbon markets. In the first group 
(UNI_20_20_10a and NETS_20_20_10a), the 10% biofuel target is reached individually by each EU 
region of DART. This is achieved by an endogenous subsidy on the national production of biofuels. In 
the second group (UNI_20_20_10b and NETS_20_20_10b), there is one overall EU target. The EU 
renewable energies directive proposal in principle establishes an individual target for each country and 
does not really provide for a burden-sharing in meeting the 10% biofuel target but only for “statistical 
transfers of a specified amount of energy from renewable sources to be transferred from one Member 
State to another Member State” (article 7, Council of the European Union, 2008). Given this 
background, we examine the effects of a hypothetical biofuel policy designed as an overall EU target, 
which would entail a more efficient allocation of biofuel production. Concerning the renewable 
electricity, the introduction of a 10% EU biofuels target enables the renewable share to be reduced,  
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and we set the share at 25%. Since this assumption is rather ad-hoc and since our model does not 
explicitly capture the linkages between the renewable and the biofuel target, we run two more 
scenarios where the biofuel target is added to the scenarios with separated carbon markets and the 20% 
emission target only (NETS_20_10a/b). These scenarios are only used in the sensitivity analysis of the 
welfare effects of the 10% biofuel target in section 5.3. Table 3 gives an overview of all analyzed 
scenarios.  
 
4. Simulation results of the core scenarios 
Before we analyze the effects of the 10% biofuel target –  which is the focus of this paper – we briefly 
summarize the main results of the six core scenarios. Figure 2 shows the carbon prices for the year 
2020 in these scenarios
4, while figure 3 shows the welfare changes relative to the business-as-usual 
scenario measured as equivalent variation.  
 
[Figure 2. Welfare relative to BAU for core scenarios in 2020] 
 
[Figure 3. Carbon prices for core scenarios in 2020] 
 
The results are as expected and in line with the existing studies. The welfare effects of reaching the 
EU targets efficiently, that is, the welfare gain by implementing a uniform carbon price throughout 
Europe, are comparatively small (scenario UNI_20) on average (-2% in 2020 relative to the BAU 
scenario) but differ across regions (from -2.8% in the Mediterranean countries to -1.3 % in Eastern 
Europe and France). The carbon price rises to almost 70 Euro/tCO2 in 2020. The separated carbon 
markets where only part of the emissions are included in the EU-ETS create wedges between the 
carbon price within the ETS and outside the ETS which can be substantial as figure 3 shows. In 
Scandinavia, for example, the carbon tax outside the ETS is almost five times as high as the price in 
the ETS.  In most other regions, it is still twice or three times the price in the ETS. This creates 
                                                      
4 All values are in 2005 Euro.  
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additional welfare losses. On average, the EU now loses 2.6% relative to BAU. In countries with large 
wedges, welfare losses may even double. Based on our results, only in Eastern Europe the current 
targets for ETS vs. non-ETS are close to an optimal split. In all other regions, one could improve 
welfare by reducing the burden for the non-ETS sectors and tightening the allocation to ETS sectors.  
If there is now an additional 30% renewable target for electricity, the carbon prices fall since part of 
the necessary emission reductions are already achieved by subsidized renewable electricity. In the 
ETS, the price decreases by 22% and 33% under full and partial carbon trading, respectively. The 
reduction of the carbon tax outside the ETS is only up to 7%. Welfare losses are larger due to the 
additional constraint. As one can see reaching a 30% renewable target is already very expensive and 
almost doubles the welfare losses since the renewable potentials are almost exploited to the limit in the 
EU. When modeling a 20% renewable target, the losses are substantially lower. Sensitivity analysis 
with respect to the specification of the renewable electricity production function and production cost 
would be necessary to prove the reliability of this finding, but go beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
5. The effects of the biofuel target  
We now assess the effects of an additional 10% biofuel target in different scenarios. The focus is on 
three issues: changes in the biofuel sectors, effects on the agricultural sectors and finally overall 
welfare implications. All these results are compared with the effects of the climate package without 
this target – this is with scenarios UNI_20_20 and mainly with NETS_20_20 as well as with the BAU 
scenario. Again, we focus on the year 2020.  
 
5.1  Biofuel production and trade 
The first finding is that the EU climate targets alone do hardly increase the production and 
consumption of biofuels in Europe. Scandinavia is the only region where bioethanol production 
increases as a result of climate policy in the scenarios without a renewable target, but has little effect 
on the overall EU biofuel share.  
Figures 4 and 5 give an overview of the allocation of biofuel production in the year 2020 globally and 
within the EU, respectively, if the 10% biofuel target is imposed. Looking at global production, it is  
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clear that Brazil with its highly developed ethanol industry is the dominant producer of biofuels in the 
absence of European biofuel policy. This can be seen when comparing the bars of the BAU scenario. 
Introducing the 10% target leads to massive expansion in European biofuel production with the result 
of aggregate EU27 biofuel production slightly surpassing or at least catching up with Brazilian 
production. The US also increases its production in the policy scenarios, which will be explained by 
the trade balances discussed below.  
 
[Figure 4. Biofuel production in 2020 (in billion real 2005 Euro)] 
 
Figure 5 splits the EU27 production into the different member states or regions, which allows us to 
identify the effects of the alternative biofuel target designs (see table 3 for scenario categorizations: ‘a’ 
stands for a 10% target in each member state whereas ‘b’ stands for an aggregate 10% EU target). 
Imposing the 10% target for the EU as a whole should lead to a more efficient allocation of biofuel 
production according to regional competitiveness, which is determined by input prices, fossil fuel 
prices and biofuel markups. This implies that some countries and regions will show lower production 
volumes while others will increase their production relative to the policy scenarios of category ‘a’. As 
seen in Figure 5, Germany, the Benelux countries and the rest of EU belong to the former group while 
Great Britain, France, the Mediterranean and the Scandinavian countries increase production and thus 
become main contributors to meeting the EU 10% target. A further analysis can be conducted along 
the lines of the ETS scenario with separated carbon markets vs. the full trade scenario with a uniform 
carbon price across all sectors. While the design of the trading scheme hardly matters in the scenarios 
with individual 10% targets it substantially changes the biofuel production at least for some regions 
for an aggregated EU biofuel target. The reason is that carbon prices differ considerably between the 
two scenarios UNI and NETS which affects production costs of fossil and biofuels. Also we observe 
that the model reacts very sensitively to price changes in (bio)diesel versus (bio)gasoline that lead to a 
shift in what type of biofuels are produced.  
 
[Figure 5. European biofuel production in 2020 (in billion real 2005 Euro)]  
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Since the biofuel targets are defined in terms of consumption, imported biofuel counts towards the 
quota. Figure 6 therefore shows net exports of selected model regions for the year 2020. One feature is 
easily detected: The introduction of European biofuel policy diverts Brazilian exports away from the 
USA to the European Union. Referring back to the paragraphs above on biofuel production, this is the 
main explanation why US biofuel production increases with the European 10% target in place. In the 
BAU scenario, the United States relied to a larger degree on imports in order to fulfil their imposed 
benchmark share. Meanwhile, it is clearly shown that the EU imports more in the presence of an 
aggregate 10% target than with individual 10% targets, and that it also imports more with full carbon 
trading in place compared to the NETS scenarios. The explanation lies in the gasoline and diesel 
prices in the different scenarios and in the size of overall fuel consumption. The higher the gasoline 
and diesel prices in the EU27, the more competitive is Brazilian ethanol and the more is imported. 
Also, the larger overall fuel consumption, the larger the necessary biofuel use to achieve the same 
quota. In the scenarios with an aggregate biofuel target production costs for EU biofuels are lower 
than in the scenarios with individual 10% targets. On the other hand, carbon prices in the ETS are 
slightly higher, leading to increased production costs of fossil fuels that are part of the ETS. Obviously 
the latter effect dominates. Gross gasoline prices, for example, are on the EU average about 5% higher 
in the scenarios with an aggregate 10% target compared to the scenarios with individual 10% targets 
(see also figure 8). The same effect is at work when comparing scenarios with uniform carbon markets 
(UNI) to scenarios with separated carbon markets (NETS). In NETS, ETS prices are lower than in 
UNI and so are fossil fuel prices. Also, total fuel consumption is higher in the scenarios with an 
aggregate biofuel target than in the scenarios with regional biofuel targets, and it is higher under 
uniform trading than under separated carbon markets.  
 





5.2  Effects on agricultural and fuel prices 
Having in mind the contentious food vs. fuel debate we have witnessed with agricultural prices rising 
sharply in 2007/2008, we assess the agricultural sector effects of biofuel production. For the purpose 
of illustration, we focus on the results for the NETS scenarios only – these are in fact closest to reality. 
We first present European weighted-average prices in 2020 compared to the price of the model base 
year 2001 for the NETS biofuel benchmark and policy scenarios. We see from figure 7 that even in the 
NETS biofuel benchmark scenario biofuel feedstock prices increase by up to factor 120% from 2001 
to 2020. This will help to put the additional price effects caused by biofuel policy into perspective.  
 
[Figure 7. Growth in agricultural prices in 2001 to 2020] 
 
These additional effects are given in figure 8 while figure 9 presents the impact of biofuel policy on 
sectoral production. In these two figures, percentages refer to deviations of the 2020 policy scenario 
compared to the values of the same scenario excluding biofuel policy (i.e. NETS_20_20). The price 
effects in figure 8 are as expected much more pronounced for the production-weighted EU27 prices 
than for production-weighted world prices. This would of course change once we considered biofuel 
policy in other regions than the EU. The European prices for biofuel feedstocks rise between 4% and 
7.4% while crude oil and fossil fuel prices drop due to the associated decrease in demand. The sectors 
GRO – other grains – and AGR – rest of agriculture – also witness substantial price increases mainly 
because they are close substitutes for the energy crops competing for the scarce factor land and also 
because their production is crowded out as shown in figure 9. The fact that world price effects are 
larger with an aggregate EU target than with individual member state targets is in line with the trade 
data from figure 6, where we observed higher European imports in the former scenarios (met by 
higher Brazilian exports).    
 
[Figure 8. Price effects, in % deviation from the 2020 reference value] 
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While production in the biofuel feedstock sectors is expanded considerably, production in the 
remaining agricultural sectors such as GRO and AGR is crowded out. With inelastic demand for the 
respective goods, this leads to higher prices as seen in figure 8. In line with the price effects, the 
impacts on sectoral production are generally higher for Europe than for the world as a whole. A 
striking feature is that production of raw sugar in the EU increases considerably in the NETS_20_20-
10b compared to the _10a scenario and to a lesser extent also corn production, while oilseeds and 
wheat production decrease. These effects can be well explained by first looking at overall biodiesel 
and ethanol production in the two scenarios. While overall biofuel production is higher in the _10a 
scenario, ethanol production is actually higher in the _10b scenario implying an overly proportionate 
decrease in biodiesel production, hence the decrease in oilseed production. The bioethanol feedstock 
sugar beet is the only feedstock used for bioethanol production in Scandinavia and the dominant 
feedstock in France, two regions with increased ethanol production in the _10b scenario. REU uses 
primarily wheat for ethanol production and experiences a considerable drop in ethanol production in 
the _10b scenario, which serves as an explanation for the drop in wheat output.  
 
[Figure 9. Sectoral production effects, in % deviation from the 2020 reference value] 
 
5.3  Welfare effects of the biofuel target 
We now turn to the welfare effects of the biofuel scenarios. First of all, expectedly, the welfare is 
higher for a scenario with one overall 10% biofuel target for the EU27. The difference to the scenario 
with a biofuel target of 10% in each DART EU region is rather small, though. Welfare in the more 
efficient scenario increases on average by 0.2-0.3%. As one exception France and the Mediterranean 
countries slightly lose under separated carbon markets. 
When comparing the welfare to the scenarios UNI_20_20 and NETS_20_20 without the biofuel 
targets, welfare increases counter-intuitively to what one would expect. EU27 welfare losses relative 
to the BAU decrease by 16 to 20% depending on the biofuel scenario even though an additional 
constraint should always lead to additional welfare losses. The main reason for this finding is our 
assumption that it is optimal and cost-effective to increase renewable electricity to 30% in our  
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scenarios with the EU renewable target while biofuel shares stay the same. We then exogenously 
decrease the renewable electricity target to 25% in the biofuel scenarios. The resulting increase in 
welfare in the biofuel scenarios thus indicates that it would indeed be preferable to have a lower 
renewable electricity target (between 25 and 30%) and more biofuel production (between the 2005 
shares and 10%). To get a better impression of the welfare changes implied by the biofuel target, we 
ran two additional scenarios with only the 20% EU emission reductions plus the 10% biofuel target for 
the case of separated carbon markets, excluding a renewable electricity target. As in table 3, these 
scenarios are denoted NETS_20_10a (for a separate biofuel target for each EU regions) and 
NETS_20_10b (for an overall 10% biofuel target for the EU27).  
Figure 10 shows the welfare changes relative to BAU for the year 2020 for the two new scenarios as 
well as the relevant scenarios defined in table 3. 
 
[Figure 10: Welfare changes in the EU27 relative to BAU in 2020 in different NETS scenarios] 
 
Comparing the welfare in these two additional scenarios to the welfare in scenario NETS_20 we find 
that welfare losses indeed slightly increase (by 0.2 percentage point) for the scenario NETS_20_10a. 
But for the scenario with one overall EU biofuel target NETS_20_10b welfare increase again. The 
welfare loss relative to BAU is 0.2 percentage points lower than in the NETS_20 scenario. This is an 
interesting finding that is more difficult to explain. In a static, partial equilibrium world this would 
indeed not be possible: adding an additional biofuel target can not bring down total abatement costs. If 
it would be cost effective to rather produce biofuels than reach emission reductions elsewhere this 
would already be included in a scenario NETS_20. In the case of a CGE model that also accounts for 
equilibrium effects, there are also effects of subsidizing biofuels on fuel prices which are not 
accounted for when the model solves for the cheapest emission reductions. Klepper and Peterson 
(2006b) have shown how marginal abatement cost curves react to energy prices. They show that the 
higher energy prices gross of carbon cost, the higher the marginal abatement cost of reaching the same 
target and the higher overall welfare costs relative to a BAU scenario. In Klepper and Peterson 
(2006b), welfare costs of reaching the same regional emission target increase if other regions also  
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undertake emission reductions so that world wide energy prices net of carbon prices fall. This in turn 
would lead to higher energy use and emissions under a no-policy case for the region under scrutiny.  
Thus carbon prices increase and so do welfare losses. In this paper we have the opposite effect:  As a 
result of the biofuel policy gasoline and diesel prices net of carbon prices increase, while gross prices 
decrease due to decreased carbon prices in the ETS which are by 30% lower than in the NETS_20 
scenario. For scenario NETS_20_10b this effect is obviously bigger than the welfare losses from 
subsidizing biofuels with high abatement costs
5.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we examined the economic impacts and optimality of the different aspects of the EU 
climate package with the help of the CGE model DART. Our special focus was the significance of a 
10% biofuel target in the EU, which materialized as an actual policy target in the recent legislation. 
Scenario runs were conducted to estimate changes in biofuel production, effects on other agricultural 
production and prices and finally overall welfare implications. The results show that the EU emission 
targets alone only lead to minor increases in biofuel production, and therefore additional subsidies are 
necessary to reach the 10% biofuel target. The augmented demand for biofuels by the 10% target 
considerably affects its trade flows, most strongly for the EU and for Brazil, but also for some other 
regions such as the US. Also, there is heterogeneity in competitiveness of the biofuel sectors within 
EU regions, reflected in a marked difference in patterns for the scenarios with a collective biofuel 
target for the entire EU and those with a target for individual EU members. Agricultural prices are 
significantly increased with the biofuel target, giving some ground for the concerns expressed in the 
‘food vs. fuel’ debate. Average EU agricultural sector prices in 2020 increase up to 7% in the biofuel 
scenarios, while world agricultural prices are affected less and only increase by up to 3.5% in 2020. 
These increases in agricultural prices do not seem dramatic compared to e.g. overall European price 
increases that reach 140% from 2001-2020 in our scenarios, but also not negligible.  
                                                      
5 Cf. Boeters et al. (2008) who also find a small but negligible increase in EU27 welfare in a biofuel policy compared to a 
policy benchmark scenario, which they attribute to the decline in distortionary carbon taxes in the non-ETS sectors.  
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The results obtained so far clearly support the view that it is important to account for the linkage of 
biofuel and agricultural markets. Additional welfare losses compared to a cost-effective scenario 
where the EU 20% emission reduction target is reached occur mainly due to separated carbon markets 
and also the renewable target. The biofuel target has relatively small negative or even positive welfare 
effects in some scenarios. This leads to our result that the 10% biofuel target is rather preferable to the 
upscaling of renewable electricity to a 30% share, which is costly and more distinctively decreases 
welfare. Once additional biofuel targets in other countries are taken into account, the distortionary 
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Figure 10: Welfare changes in the EU27 relative to BAU in 2020 in different NETS scenarios 
 
 
 